Security & GovernanceLeast privilege for AI agents: scope the blast radius before anything goes wrong
An AI agent's risk is the access it holds, not how clever it is. Least privilege scopes four axes, tools, data, actions and duration, so a tricked or mistaken agent can only do a little.
Security & GovernanceDefending against prompt injection: contain what you cannot prevent
Prompt injection cannot be reliably prevented, because a model cannot tell instructions from data. The defensible posture is containment: bound what a tricked agent can do, and keep tamper-evident proof of what it did.
Security & GovernanceAI agent security is an access problem, not a model problem
AI agent security is about the access an agent holds, not whether the model behaves. How to secure AI agents: blast radius, human approval, credential custody, tamper-evident evidence.
Security & GovernanceHow do you prove what your AI agent actually did?
When an AI agent touches production, a log is not enough. The security case for witnessed, tamper-evident evidence: what happened, when, by whom, and a record a third party can verify.
Security & GovernanceThe AI agent kill switch: containment without evidence is not control
A kill switch that leaves no record of why it triggered, what state the agent was in, and who pulled it is not a control. It is an outage with a story you will have to reconstruct from memory.